Governor Brian Kemp’s signing of Senate Bill 68 on April 21, 2025, introduces a new statutory framework for negligent security cases in Georgia. These cases arise when individuals suffer injuries or death on someone else’s property due to the landowner’s or occupier’s failure to implement reasonable security measures to protect against criminal acts by third parties. Previously, such claims followed the general premises liability provisions of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) § 51-3-1, which also covers other premises liability cases, such as trip-and-fall or slip-and-fall claims. The newly enacted statutes significantly narrow the circumstances under which a negligent security claim can succeed and impose stricter standards for establishing liability.

It is important to note that the provisions discussed below have not been tested in court, and involve a comprehensive reform of the law. The concepts are sometimes highly technical and often have specific legal meanings, or intended meanings, which in many cases are not clear or remain to be determined.

So, a standard lawyer disclaimer is appropriate here: nothing in this article should be considered legal advice, and you are advised to contact a lawyer if you have a claim implicated by the new laws.

When do the new laws go into effect?

Section 9 of SB 68 specifies the effective dates of the new laws. For negligent security cases, the law applies “only with respect to causes of action arising on or after the effective date of this Act,” which is April 21, 2025, the date the governor signed the bill. A “cause of action” refers to the date of the injury or wrongful act. As a result, incidents of injury or death resulting from negligent security that occurred before this date will be governed by the previous law, while cases arising on or after that date will be subject to the new legal framework outlined below. This applies regardless of when a lawsuit is filed.

A note about visitor status in premises liability and negligent security cases

As with other premises liability laws, a landowner’s or occupier’s duty—and potential liability—depends on the visitor’s status. The general classifications, which have been refined through various court interpretations, are as follows:

• Invitee: Generally, an invitee is someone who enters the premises for a business purpose or for the mutual benefit (generally, though not always, a business or financial benefit) of both the visitor and the owner or occupier. This category excludes social guests like a visitor to a neighborhood gathering or party. But it would include customers of a business, patrons of a restaurant, or tenants of an apartment complex.

• Licensee: A licensee is someone who enters the premises with the owner’s or occupier’s permission but not for a business purpose. Social guests, such as visitors attending a private party like those discussed above, or houseguests, are typically considered licensees.

• Trespasser: A trespasser is someone who enters the premises without the owner’s or occupier’s permission. But this does not mean that the person has to have specific permission to visit the property. Customers of a store are not trespassers, even though they have not been specifically invited. On the other hand, trespassers also don’t have to be specifically prohibited: a person can be a trespasser to a private, non-commercial property if they have never been invited nor implicitly invited to visit. This can be a somewhat tricky area: a door-to-door salesman probably would not be a trespasser, but a burglar certainly would be. This is an area where the law requires factual considerations.

These classifications serve as general guidelines, but determining a visitor’s status sometimes involves complex factual and legal questions that may require resolution by the court.

Statutory summary

The new statutes governing negligent security claims are found in Section 6 of SB 68 (read text here) and include seven new code sections, O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-50 through 51-3-57, which are codified in a newly created Article 5 of Title 51, Chapter 3. In addition to these specific provisions, other sections of SB 68 impact civil and tort cases more broadly, including negligent security and other premises liability claims, and are discussed in a previous article (read here). The new statutes specific to negligent security are summarized below:

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-50: Defines the terms and concepts used throughout Article 5, which includes this section and all subsequent sections through O.C.G.A. § 51-3-57.

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-51: Establishes the general duties owed by landowners or occupiers to invitees in negligent security cases.

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-52: Establishes the general duties owed by landowners or occupiers to licensees in negligent security cases.

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-53: Declares that the new statutes provide the exclusive remedy for negligent security claims. However, claims brought under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-56, which governs human trafficking, are exempt from these new rules, but only if the claims specifically relate to sex trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-46.

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-54: Enumerates circumstances when there is no liability for negligent security. These include claims made by trespassers; claims arising at a single-family residence; and claims made by a person who was engaged in a felony or certain misdemeanor crimes at the time. 

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-55: Identifies factors that courts may consider in determining whether the landowner or occupier fulfilled their duties to visitors.

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-56: Makes clear that the apportionment rules of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 apply to negligent security cases. It further requires apportionment to certain classes of persons, specifically including the third person whose conduct caused the harm. Under this statute, there is a rebuttable presumption that a jury’s apportionment is unreasonable if the jury does not apportion enough fault to the criminal third party. The specific amount can differ depending on the facts.

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-57: Extends the applicability of these rules to security contractors, including security guards and security companies.

Analysis

At the outset, it is important to understand what “negligent security” claims are for purposes of application of the new laws. Generally, negligent security claims arise when a landowner or occupier fails to maintain safe premises, resulting in criminal acts committed by third parties. For instance, if an individual is mugged or assaulted in the parking lot of a grocery store or an apartment complex, it may give rise to a negligent security claim. Victims in these cases typically must demonstrate that the property owner knew about potential dangers to visitors and failed to address or mitigate those risks. While the new law retains these basic principles, it specifies in greater detail, and significantly limits, the conditions under which a premises owner or occupier can be held liable, and generally makes those conditions substantially more limited.

Negligent security claims, as defined under the new law, are those that:

• Are made as a tort or nuisance claim.
• Seek to recover for bodily injury or wrongful death.
• Arise from an alleged failure to keep the premises and approaches safe from the wrongful conduct of third parties.

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-50(1).

Some have argued that the law would preclude “dram shop” cases, which are cases based on someone—usually an employee of a bar or restaurant—providing alcohol to a third party who is expected to be driving a car and as a result an innocent third party is injured by a drunk driver. But it is not clear that the statutory definition of “negligent security” would cover this sort of case. First, dram shop cases have not traditionally been categorized as premises liability cases, though the danger originates on a premises. Second, these cases do not involve claims that premises were unsafe due to a failure to maintain them, but rather involve allegations that a premises owner created a hazardous condition affecting persons off-site. Still, this argument may continue to develop as courts interpret the new statutes.

As previously stated, the duties and potential liabilities of property owners or occupiers vary based on whether a visitor is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Therefore, the following analysis will explain how the new laws apply to each visitor category. It will also address other provisions, including blanket exclusions from liability, under certain circumstances.

Invitees – O.C.G.A. § 51-3-51

As in general premises liability law, property owners or occupiers owe the highest duty of care to invitees—visitors with whom they have a business relationship or a mutually beneficial arrangement (excluding social guests). Under the new negligent security statute, an owner or occupier may be liable under two general theories, each with specific sub-requirements:

• The owner or occupier “Had particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct by a third person” or
• The owner or occupier “Reasonably should have known that a third party” would likely engage in wrongful conduct.

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-51(1).

With respect to the first theory, the “particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct” requires that the owner or occupier had actual knowledge of information that it deemed credible that caused it to understand that a third person was likely to engage in “imminent” wrongful conduct that posed a clear danger to the safety of visitors. The information known must be specific as to the identity of the person who could cause harm, the nature and character of that person’s conduct, the degree of danger of that conduct, and the location, time, and circumstances of that wrongful conduct. In short, the owner or occupier must have precise, specific knowledge of the potential harm before liability attaches under this theory. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-50(3).

The second theory, where the landowner “Reasonably should have known” that a third party might harm a visitor, is similar to the standard that was often applied under the prior law. But the standards for determining what is reasonable have been specifically defined, and significantly limited. Now, a victim must demonstrate that an owner or occupier meets one of the following three requirements:

• Actual knowledge of prior instances of “substantially similar wrongful conduct” on the premises. 
• Actual knowledge of prior instances of “substantially similar wrongful conduct” on an adjoining premises or within 500 yards of the premises.
• Actual knowledge of prior instances of substantially similar wrongful conduct by the actual perpetrator if the owner or occupier knew, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person would be on the premises.

The requirement of “actual knowledge” under the new law is significant because previously, knowledge was frequently established through “constructive knowledge.” Constructive knowledge meant that even if an owner or occupier did not actually know about a hazardous condition, the law treated them as if they did because they would have discovered it had they exercised reasonable diligence by being generally aware of the condition of their property, including crime. 

In reality, owners or occupiers—often out-of-state corporate investors or landlords—may take a hands-off approach to operating their properties and not bother to look into incidents that contribute to unsafe or hazardous conditions. This is often the case with out-of-state apartment complex owners. The new requirement for actual knowledge will likely increase risks on these properties, as owners now have an incentive to remain unaware—as by turning a blind eye to problems—of potential dangers.

If a claimant proves either (1) that there was a particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct or (2) that the owner or occupier reasonably should have known about the risk, the new law imposes additional requirements:

• The victim’s injury must have been a foreseeable consequence of the third party’s wrongful actions.
• The wrongful conduct must have been a foreseeable result of the third party exploiting a specific physical condition on the premises, which was known to the owner or occupier, and which created a risk substantially greater than the general risk in the surrounding area.
• The owner or occupier must have failed to remedy or mitigate that specific physical condition.
• The owner or occupier’s failure to address the condition must have been a proximate cause of the injury.

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-51(2)-(5).

Most of these provisions align with traditional tort principles related to foreseeability and causation. However, the phrase “specific physical condition” will likely generate considerable litigation and appellate debate. For example, it is unclear from the statutory language whether plaintiffs must identify a specific broken or malfunctioning security device (such as a broken gate, lock, or camera) or whether liability may arise from an owner’s or occupier’s complete failure to install or maintain common security measures. The statute itself does not clarify these issues.

Licensees – O.C.G.A. § 51-3-52

For licensees, an owner or occupier’s duties are similar to those owed to invitees regarding situations involving a “particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct by a third person.” However, unlike with invitees, the law does not impose any duty toward licensees in situations where an owner or occupier “reasonably should have known” about the risk posed by a third party. Therefore, consistent with other types of premises liability cases, the duties owed to licensees are significantly lower than those owed to invitees.

Trespassers – O.C.G.A. § 51-3-54(1)

In a section providing for general exclusions from any liability to owners and occupiers, the law provides that no duty is owed to trespassers. 

Other exclusions from negligent security liability – O.C.G.A. § 51-3-54

If a plaintiff successfully proves the basic requirements for a negligent security claim brought by an invitee or licensee, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-54 still identifies several circumstances under which the owner or occupier will not be liable. Beyond explicitly excluding liability for injuries to trespassers, the statute also bars claims in the following scenarios:

• Injury to someone located off-premises: No claim exists if the injured person was not physically on the owner or occupier’s premises. For instance, this provision likely bars claims arising from injuries caused by a person firing a gun from the property that hits someone across the street.
• Wrongful conduct occurring off-premises: There is no liability if the wrongful conduct by a third party occurred off-premises and in an area from which the owner or occupier did not have the right to exclude others. However, this provision is unclear—it could imply liability might still apply if the owner or occupier had a right to exclude the wrongdoer from that off-premises location.
• Conduct by a tenant or the tenant’s guest: If the wrongful conduct was committed by a tenant or the tenant’s guest, and the owner or occupier had already initiated eviction proceedings against that tenant at the time of the incident, there is no liability.
• Victim involved in criminal activity: Liability is excluded if the injured party was committing—or attempting to commit—a felony or misdemeanor involving theft at the time of the injury. This exclusion, however, does not apply to victims of sex trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-46.
• Single-family residence: Claims are precluded for injuries occurring at premises used as single-family homes.
• Reporting particularized warnings to law enforcement: In cases involving a “particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct by a third party,” the property owner or occupier will not be liable if they made reasonable efforts to notify law enforcement of the danger. Specifically, the statute identifies making a 911 call as sufficient to meet this requirement. Thus, an owner or occupier with actual knowledge of imminent harm avoids liability by calling 911, even if other preventative measures could reasonably have been taken.

Specific considerations provided by the law in assessing liability in negligent security cases – O.C.G.A. § 51-3-55

First, the statute states that owners and occupiers shall not “be required to exercise extraordinary care to keep persons on or around any premises safe from wrongful conduct by a third person, and no owner or occupier shall be required to assume the responsibilities and obligations of government for law enforcement and public safety.” It is unclear how this adds to the existing law, which includes neither of these requirements.

Second, the statute identifies specific considerations the jury or judge must evaluate when deciding these cases, including:

• The security measures the owner or occupier had in place at the time of the injury.
• Whether additional or alternative security measures were necessary.
• The practicality of implementing additional or alternative security measures.
• Whether additional or alternative security measures would have prevented the injury.
• The respective responsibilities of property owners or occupiers (regarding premises safety) compared to those of the government (regarding law enforcement and public safety).
• Any other relevant circumstances.

Because the statute explicitly mandates these considerations (“the trier of fact shall consider…”), they are likely to be included in jury instructions in negligent security cases.

Additional rules governing apportionment in negligent security cases – O.C.G.A. § 51-3-56

A statute amended in 2005 as part of a prior round of tort reform, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33, established rules for apportionment between parties and, in some cases, non-parties. SB68 expands on these requirements in negligent security cases by providing additional requirements, considerations, and rules for apportionment.

At the outset, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-56 requires apportionment to certain classes of parties or non-parties:

• The owner or occupier.
• The third person whose wrongful conduct caused the harm.
• Any other person to whom fault should be apportioned under existing law (O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33).

One notable aspect of this change is that apportionment to the third person now appears to be compulsory. Under existing law, apportionment was not generally required except among parties to the case unless a party filed an appropriate notice of non-party fault. That no longer appears to be the case for the third parties described above. 

Additionally, the new law explicitly prohibits the introduction of evidence related to any criminal penalties (such as fines, imprisonment, or other punishment) imposed—or that could be imposed—on the third party. It also excludes evidence regarding the financial resources of any party or nonparty, as well as the impact apportionment would have on the victim’s recovery.

Furthermore, while juries have traditionally had wide discretion in assigning fault, the new statute requires a retrial if the jury fails to apportion any fault to the third party. The law also establishes a rebuttable presumption that a jury’s allocation of fault is unreasonable if the percentage assigned to the third party is lower than the combined fault of any owners, occupiers, security contractors, or other parties involved.

The language is, unfortunately, not altogether clear. For example, does the calculation above include any fault of the plaintiff? It seems that it might logically include that apportionment, but it is curious that the statute specifically listed owners, occupiers, and security contractors but contemplated plaintiffs only in the “other person or entity” category. Additionally, while it can be surmised that this “rebuttable presumption” would be used as a basis for a new trial or perhaps on appeal, it is unclear who would apply that presumption, since the jury would have been excused by that point, and evidence would be closed. And the conclusions of fact finders—juries or judges in a bench trial— are generally afforded great deference in their factual finding, and apportionment is a factual finding. Interpretation and application of this portion of the law is likely to result in uncertainty in the foreseeable future. 

Security contractors – O.C.G.A. § 51-3-57

The final section of the negligent security laws states that security contractors can only be liable for negligent security claims to the same extent—and under the same conditions and limitations—as property owners or occupiers under these statutes. Unfortunately, like other sections of Senate Bill 68, this provision is poorly drafted and likely to cause confusion. Indeed, its unclear meaning was noted but left unresolved during Georgia Senate committee hearings on the bill.

Security contractors occupy a fundamentally different role from property owners; their specific duty is to maintain safety and security on the premises, which traditionally has carried different liabilities. If interpreted literally, the new statute might allow a security contractor to avoid liability simply by calling the police whenever danger is anticipated, as described in O.C.G.A. § 51-3-54(7).

However, the final subsection also states that “Nothing in this code section shall limit or otherwise affect any claim or remedy of an owner or occupier for breach of contract.” (O.C.G.A. § 51-3-57(c)). It remains unclear how this contractual provision interacts with other parts of the negligent security statutes, creating potential uncertainty and future litigation.

Conclusion

The negligent security amendments introduced by Senate Bill 68 were clearly intended to reduce liability for property owners and occupiers, as well as to lower damages awards. While these goals may achieved, the lack of clear language and reliance on vague concepts will probably result in prolonged litigation as trial and appeals courts interpret the statutes. Additionally, the law’s more extreme provisions will likely decrease safety on commercial properties and put Georgia citizens at greater risk. It is also highly questionable whether the changes will result in a lowering of insurance rates, as seemingly promised by Governor Kemp, because insurers are already turning record profits in Georgia without these changes.